
IRAN-PAKISTAN RELATIONS
Pakistan-Iran relations have been marked by several ebbs and flows. The story has two distinct chapters: Shah’s Iran and post-Revolution Iran. Both chapters also have distinct geopolitical backdrops.
Iran was the first country to recognise Pakistan and the Shah became the first head of state to visit Pakistan. The two countries had also signed a Treaty of Friendship on February 18, 1950. Both were part of the US-led Western bloc and founding members of the Central Treaty Organisation (Cento).
In 1958, the Shah also pitched the idea of a Pakistan-Iran confederation, an “Aryan bloc” against communism, with a single, unified army and a combined authority for defence, foreign affairs, and treasury. Later, he also wanted to include Afghanistan into such an arrangement. The problem: he wanted himself at the head of the confederation!
Iran also helped Pakistan during the 1965 and 1971 wars, and the Shah looked at the territorial integrity of Pakistan after the formation of Bangladesh as vital for Iran’s interests. After the revolution, concurrently with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the start of Iran-Iraq war, many determinants underwent a change.
Six primary issues of concern have evolved over decades: 1) revolution versus status quo (spreading influence versus keeping traditional structures intact); 2) Afghanistan (conflict of interest and support for different groups); 3) sectarian tensions (including Pakistan’s support for the Taliban and the killing of undercover Iranian intelligence officers in Mazar-i-Sharif in 1998 and the killing of two Iranian diplomats in the 1990s in two separate incidents in Pakistan);
competition for regional influence in Central Asia;
growing Iran-India ties; and 6) Baloch separatists and border management.
Despite pressure from Riyadh, Pakistan supported Iran in its war against Iraq. While the Soviets were in Afghanistan, both countries supported the insurgency. Both have sought economic cooperation, established protocols for border management and established protocols for intelligence-sharing on Baloch separatists and smuggling networks. Pakistan fully supported Iran in the 12-Day War in 2025, creating the space which has allowed it this time to play the mediation role.
The debate over a new Gulf security architecture has therefore to be seen in the backdrop of a relationship that has witnessed crests and troughs. Yet, precisely because of Iran’s concerns in the west and Pakistan’s in the east and northwest, the two sides have sought to manage bilateral issues amicably, occasional harsh words notwithstanding.
For Pakistan, navigating a changing Gulf landscape is a delicate balancing act between its relations with Saudi Arabia and its immediate geopolitical necessity to maintain a peaceful western border with Iran.
Pakistan’s approach to the Middle East is strictly governed by a policy of strategic restraint and non-entrapment. Aligning with an exclusionary Sunni bloc (such as a Saudi-led anti-Iran framework) would trigger Morgenthau’s entrapment scenario. Put simply, Pakistan cannot be dragged into a regional conflict with Iran.
For Islamabad, preserving its détente with Iran and investing in a deeper relationship with Tehran are core national security imperatives. This is also evident from Pakistan’s approach to the UAE’s remonstrations during the current mediation episode.
Corollary: while Islamabad will deepen relations with the GCC monarchies on a bilateral basis, it will steadfastly refuse to be part of any architecture that seeks to isolate Tehran. Conversely, if a genuine, inclusive regional mediation effort succeeds and Iran is integrated into a wider Gulf security framework, Pakistan stands to gain immense strategic relief. A stable, non-adversarial Gulf would allow Islamabad to operationalise its cooperative geo-economic shift currently weighed down by regional conflicts.
This is precisely why Pakistan was and remains so active in mediating this conflict.
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