The only problem? The award appeared to be so hastily manufactured that the certificate misspelled the host country's name—twice. "Republic" became "Repubblic," and "Seychelles" was miswritten as "Seycheeles" . Observers noted the award was instituted just three days before Modi's arrival, making him its first and only recipient .

To add to the embarrassment, the certificate was widely flagged as AI-generated . The opposition Indian National Congress was quick to pounce, with one politician stating, "Give him [Modi] any award, and he'll come running" .

A Pattern of Manufactured Glory

This is not an isolated incident. Critics have pointed to a recurring pattern of "manufactured recognition":

• Israel's "Knesset Medal": Days before Modi's visit to Israel, the parliament hastily created a medal, with Modi as the sole recipient .

• The "Philip Kotler Award": In 2019, Modi became the first recipient of this Indian award, which was supposed to be annual but has never been given to anyone else since .

Modi's biographer noted that collecting these "often bestowed in circumstances that raise eyebrows" awards is a calculated move to project global greatness .

Pakistan's Defence Minister Reacts

Pakistan Defence Minister Khawaja Asif posted:

"This has to be the most embarrassing story ever. Awards created days before arrival, certificates printed through use of cheap AI model, obvious spelling mistakes, and then Narendra Modi becoming first & the only recipient. This…

— Grok (@grok) July 6, 2026

Pakistan's Defence Minister Khawaja Asif described the episode as "the most embarrassing story ever" and stated that Modi is "putting the Indian Nation to shame" . He further noted that even Indian opposition leaders like Rahul Gandhi and international media like The Guardian have questioned the credibility of these honours .

Prime suspect Atif Zaman and his brother, Adil Zaman, were arrested and booked by the police for killing Abbas and Khizer Hayat, who were their business partners, in Karachi’s Khayaban-i-Bukhari area on the night of July 9, 2019, exactly seven years ago.

Daniyal Muhammad Hussain, who was part of the legal team that represented Abbas’s wife, said that Adil had been declared an absconder in the case after escaping following the cancellation of his bail by the Supreme Court’s Karachi registry.

Abbas was a Bol News anchorperson. In the incident — which at the time was said to be a “personal dispute” — he was gunned down while Hayat also received two bullet wounds.

Hayat was shifted to a private hospital but he succumbed to his wounds, according to the police.

In October 2019, the case was transferred from an anti-terrorism court to a sessions court, with the former ruling that the offence did not fell within its ambit.

FOREWORD

The United States-Zionist war of aggression on Iran has been partially halted by a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). Given the rising cost-exchange ratio because of Iran’s response, US President Donald Trump was looking for a deal.

He admitted to the media at the G-7 summit that he “did not want to be the late, great Herbert Hoover”, the president historically blamed for the onset of the Great Depression. Trump also made plain that continuing the war meant global recession.

He started a wrong war. But he is right about ending it. The blockade of the Strait of Hormuz nearly paralysed a massive ecosystem of oil and gas and petroleum derivatives and byproducts. Food security was affected because fertiliser strangulation hit farming sectors in the region and beyond at several critical pressure points.

The blockade bottlenecked shipping lanes for vital agricultural commodities. Prices were skyrocketing. The global agri-food system was being threatened to a point where the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) warned of a “catastrophe”.

Polls in the US showed the war was deeply unpopular. Trump’s ratings have plummeted. With the Congress up for grabs, the war with Iran was becoming a highly toxic liability for the Republican party ahead of the November elections. Having failed at achieving all the changing and stated objectives of the war, there were no real, military-operational options left with Trump, short of unleashing aimless destructive savagery that would push the region, already teetering on the brink, over the cliff.

Iran, for its part, while taking and absorbing the pain, was prepared to accept the cost of waiting and forcing Trump to blink. He did. What next now?

The war launched on Iran by the US and Israel has, among many other things, irreversibly transformed the Gulf’s strategic landscape. It appears that the old security paradigm has collapsed and, much as the US might wish, the situation cannot revert to the pre-war status quo ante. But can an inclusive regional order emerge in its place?

BACK TO BUSINESS?

The MoU addresses the immediate situation and tries to take immediate pressure off the US, Iran and the Gulf states, but it does not, cannot, address the structural reasons for the almost five-decade-long conflict that has defined relations between Iran and the US and Iran and the Zionist entity.

And if we throw in the Palestinian conflict, in many ways central to the broader conflict in the Middle East, we are talking about a century. In many ways the two have become inextricably linked.

Second, while the US and the Zionists attacked Iran together, any deal, partial or full, between Iran and the US has to be treated separately from the conflictual bind in which the Middle East finds itself because of land, rights and dignity stolen from the Palestinians.

Three, parsing the issues requires narrowing the focus here to analyse the geopolitics of the Gulf: there was a pre-war Gulf and there’s a post-war Gulf and a gulf separates the two.

Four, the war was an inflection point, though change won’t come overnight. The US as the net security provider in the Gulf is not about to relinquish that role, tied in as it is with its core interests. The Zionist regime thrives on perpetual conflict with the help of the US and will not change course, even as it will make minor tactical adjustments in its strategy, in deference to US sensitivities at particular moments.

That leaves the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states. They partnered with the US and provided it bases to act as a counterweight to Iran and enhance their security. The quid for the quo was to ensure global energy security and to become an investment and development hub by diversifying fossil-fuel-based economies. Iran’s retaliation against those bases and critical infrastructure has exposed the structural-geographic flaw in that approach.

What are their choices now? They can’t stay the old course. How do they think anew?

There are three options. Treat Iran as an inveterate foe; figure out a security and/or cooperative framework that is inclusive of Iran; or find a median — keep their relationship with the US but also remain verifiably neutral in any future US-Zionist-Iran conflict, a position somewhere between being actively in the anti-Iran camp and pulling Iran into the GCC tent.

Whatever course the GCC might take would require us to deconstruct the history of institutional friction within the GCC itself and examine the theoretical prerequisites of collective security being talked about.

An allied concern for us is the cascading effects of a future architecture on Pakistan-Iran relations. Finally, I close with three distinct scenarios for the future of the region.

GCC: INSTITUTIONAL FRICTION

A good benchmark for evaluating the feasibility of a pan-Gulf or expanded regional security pact is the region’s existing sub-regional body: the GCC. Established in 1981 in response to the twin shocks of the Iranian Revolution and the Iran-Iraq War, the GCC was designed to achieve “…coordination, integration, and interconnection among member states in all fields.”

Security cooperation was relatively straightforward initially. Five members supported Iraq against Iran and all rallied to Kuwait’s defence after Iraq’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait. But as the 1990s progressed, and particularly after 2000, rivalries among member states emerged and have since become the defining feature of the Gulf’s politico-economic landscape.

Member states have pursued distinct and sometimes conflicting objectives; they possess uneven economic wealth and regional leverage and remain susceptible to external power influence (bilateral security arrangements with the US is a case in point). Each has differing imperatives for doing so (Qatar’s multitrack approach is a good study).

Today’s conversations about a collective security architecture appear to forget that these states established a Peninsula Shield Force in 1984 (renamed Unified Military Command in 2021), which could provide a foundation, but has not because the GCC has shown a lack of institutional cohesion and any unified strategic purpose.

By most evidence, the primary impediment to GCC unity has been the tension between Saudi heft and the desire of the smaller states to preserve their strategic autonomy. Saudi Arabia has historically viewed the GCC as a vehicle to project its leadership over the Arabian Peninsula.

This ambition has frequently sparked resistance from its smaller neighbours, most notably Qatar and Oman and, more recently, the UAE. The intra-GCC fissures were manifested glaringly in the 2017–21 diplomatic crisis with Qatar.

Another factor is the divergence in threat perceptions. While Saudi Arabia and Bahrain traditionally viewed Iran as a revisionist threat, the UAE had maintained a more transactional, commerce-driven relationship with Tehran, particularly through the Emirate of Dubai.

With the Abraham Accords and the UAE’s diplomatic, economic and military entanglement with the Zionist regime, relations between Abu Dhabi and Tehran have hit a nadir. Since at least 2018, but more overtly since 2024, Saudi-UAE relations have also sailed into choppy waters because of Abu Dhabi’s desire to punch above its weight and pursue policies in the region and beyond that undermine Riyadh’s interests.

The upshot is that the GCC’s history proves that shared regime types (hereditary monarchies in this case) and cultural/linguistic affinities are insufficient to overcome deep-seated security dilemmas and conflicting national interests.

ALLIANCE OR COLLECTIVE SECURITY?

The talk about a collective security architecture seems to assume that any such arrangement will be a protection against an external threat. That’s incorrect. There’s a critical conceptual distinction between an ‘alliance’ and ‘collective security architecture.’ Their structural mechanics, operational orientations and requirements for balancing power are radically different.

An alliance is an outward-looking arrangement organised by a group of states to defend against a clearly identified external aggressor. Alliances require a dominant power to act as the primary security provider, regulate internal disputes, and absorb the costs of deterrence. An alliance is an instrument of the balance-of-power system, designed to counter a threat from the outside.

Nato and the extinct Warsaw Pact are primary examples. Both relied on an absolute centre of gravity. In the case of Nato, the US; in the case of the Warsaw Pact, the Soviet Union.

Conversely, a collective security system is an inward-looking architecture. It does not operate on balancing power against an external enemy, but on the principle of “all for one and one for all.”

A group of states agree that a breach of peace by any member of the system will be considered an attack against all members. It occupies what American professor of international relations Inis Claude called “middle ground” in global power management, positioned strictly between international anarchy and a world government.

At a global level, the extinct League of Nations and the waning UN are examples of such an arrangement. At the regional level, one could cite the example of the African Union Peace and Security Council. A bit of stretch could also bring in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean) which, while not an internal military arrangement, relies on dialogue and the Asean Regional Forum to reduce the risk of conflict through the “Asean way.

Instead of requiring a dominant hegemon, a true collective security architecture demands diffusion of power, so that no single state can defy the collective will of the institutional community.

Several stringent political and structural requirements must be fulfilled for a collective security architecture to function successfully: 1) The distribution of power within the system must be sufficiently diffuse;

2. member states must possess a shared consensus on what constitutes a threat to peace and security;

3. states must be willing to relinquish strategic autonomy, even if doing so conflicts with immediate national self-interest; 4) states must genuinely renounce the use of military force to settle internal, bilateral disputes; and finally, 5) a collective security architecture cannot achieve stability if it excludes a primary geopolitical actor within that geographic space (consider Iran here).

Exclusion returns the system to a competitive, exclusionary, balance-of-power alliance, which naturally invites counter-alliances and proxy warfare.

Does the expanded Gulf region — including potential external anchors such as Pakistan and Turkiye — fulfil these five theoretical prerequisites? No.

The first requirement of having no single dominant power fails because the distribution of power is highly asymmetric and contested. The region features multiple heavyweight actors vying for influence, including Saudi Arabia, Iran and Turkiye, none of whom is willing to relinquish strategic autonomy.

Pakistan, while a nuclear-armed state with impressive military capabilities, is hamstrung by chronic domestic economic instability and political polarisation. Also, while peace in the Gulf is vital for Pakistan, Islamabad’s strategic focus remains structurally tethered to its eastern border with India. To act as an external security guarantor — as opposed to being a mediator — in a complex Middle Eastern architecture is currently beyond its capacity.

The second requirement of identical threat perceptions also fails because regional worldviews and national interests are diametrically opposed rather than aligned. The third requirement, the subordination of national sovereignty, fails because of number two. The fourth requirement, the renunciation of force, is routinely violated because national interests remain supreme.

Finally, the fifth requirement of inclusivity of major stakeholders fails because current proposals, implicitly or explicitly, attempt to isolate or structurally exclude Iran. Geographically, Iran commands the entire northern coast of the Persian Gulf and the strategic choke point of the Strait of Hormuz. Excluding Iran automatically reduces any security architecture to an anti-Iran military containment alliance. This structural exclusion guarantees that Tehran will view any such pact as an existential encirclement, incentivising it to use its asymmetric war doctrine to destabilise the architecture from the outside.

This is why scholars such as both Hans Morgenthau (classical realism) and Kenneth Waltz (neorealism) argued that the concept is fundamentally flawed, because it ignores the realities of global anarchy, state sovereignty, and self-interest.

IRAN-PAKISTAN RELATIONS

Pakistan-Iran relations have been marked by several ebbs and flows. The story has two distinct chapters: Shah’s Iran and post-Revolution Iran. Both chapters also have distinct geopolitical backdrops.

Iran was the first country to recognise Pakistan and the Shah became the first head of state to visit Pakistan. The two countries had also signed a Treaty of Friendship on February 18, 1950. Both were part of the US-led Western bloc and founding members of the Central Treaty Organisation (Cento).

In 1958, the Shah also pitched the idea of a Pakistan-Iran confederation, an “Aryan bloc” against communism, with a single, unified army and a combined authority for defence, foreign affairs, and treasury. Later, he also wanted to include Afghanistan into such an arrangement. The problem: he wanted himself at the head of the confederation!

Iran also helped Pakistan during the 1965 and 1971 wars, and the Shah looked at the territorial integrity of Pakistan after the formation of Bangladesh as vital for Iran’s interests. After the revolution, concurrently with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the start of Iran-Iraq war, many determinants underwent a change.

Six primary issues of concern have evolved over decades: 1) revolution versus status quo (spreading influence versus keeping traditional structures intact); 2) Afghanistan (conflict of interest and support for different groups); 3) sectarian tensions (including Pakistan’s support for the Taliban and the killing of undercover Iranian intelligence officers in Mazar-i-Sharif in 1998 and the killing of two Iranian diplomats in the 1990s in two separate incidents in Pakistan);

4. competition for regional influence in Central Asia;

5. growing Iran-India ties; and 6) Baloch separatists and border management.

Despite pressure from Riyadh, Pakistan supported Iran in its war against Iraq. While the Soviets were in Afghanistan, both countries supported the insurgency. Both have sought economic cooperation, established protocols for border management and established protocols for intelligence-sharing on Baloch separatists and smuggling networks. Pakistan fully supported Iran in the 12-Day War in 2025, creating the space which has allowed it this time to play the mediation role.

The debate over a new Gulf security architecture has therefore to be seen in the backdrop of a relationship that has witnessed crests and troughs. Yet, precisely because of Iran’s concerns in the west and Pakistan’s in the east and northwest, the two sides have sought to manage bilateral issues amicably, occasional harsh words notwithstanding.

For Pakistan, navigating a changing Gulf landscape is a delicate balancing act between its relations with Saudi Arabia and its immediate geopolitical necessity to maintain a peaceful western border with Iran.

Pakistan’s approach to the Middle East is strictly governed by a policy of strategic restraint and non-entrapment. Aligning with an exclusionary Sunni bloc (such as a Saudi-led anti-Iran framework) would trigger Morgenthau’s entrapment scenario. Put simply, Pakistan cannot be dragged into a regional conflict with Iran.

For Islamabad, preserving its détente with Iran and investing in a deeper relationship with Tehran are core national security imperatives. This is also evident from Pakistan’s approach to the UAE’s remonstrations during the current mediation episode.

Corollary: while Islamabad will deepen relations with the GCC monarchies on a bilateral basis, it will steadfastly refuse to be part of any architecture that seeks to isolate Tehran. Conversely, if a genuine, inclusive regional mediation effort succeeds and Iran is integrated into a wider Gulf security framework, Pakistan stands to gain immense strategic relief. A stable, non-adversarial Gulf would allow Islamabad to operationalise its cooperative geo-economic shift currently weighed down by regional conflicts.

This is precisely why Pakistan was and remains so active in mediating this conflict.

THREE GEOPOLITICAL SCENARIOS FOR THE FUTURE OF THE GULF

Given the historical grievances of the region, the structural constraints that bind the states and the current security dynamics, three potential scenarios emerge for the future of the Gulf’s security architecture.

Mini-Lateral Hubs

In this high-probability, low-stability scenario, a comprehensive collective security architecture fails to materialise because states cannot overcome the structural hurdles of threat perception and sovereignty. Instead, the region fragments into overlapping, transactional ‘mini-lateral’ networks.

This could take several shapes. For instance, Saudi Arabia could maintain its fragile bilateral détente with Iran via Chinese and Iraqi mediation to protect its economic transformation projects. Concurrently, Riyadh could deepen its bilateral defence integration with the US through a standalone security pact, while avoiding a formal regional alliance and seeking US military support only in the event of being attacked.

Turkiye and Qatar could expand their defence industrial cooperation, while the UAE pursues an independent, trade-first foreign policy, engaging Tehran and Tel Aviv simultaneously. Kuwait and Oman return to balancing between Riyadh and Tehran. The US bases in the Gulf are vacated (there’s already a debate in the US about pulling them westwards).

This creates a highly fluid, poly-centric regional order. Stability is maintained not by institutional rules, but through a fragile, constantly renegotiated balance of power.

While the mini-laterals try to avoid an expansive regional war, the region remains highly vulnerable to miscalculation and sudden escalations, especially if the Zionist regime continues with its policy of Palestinian genocide and attacks in Lebanon and Syria (the US mediation in Lebanon seeks to separate that issue from what is contained in the MoU and pit the Lebanese government against Hezbollah, to create civil-war conditions in that country).

For Pakistan, this scenario means a continuation of its current dilemma: how to stay out of the fray and keep a diplomatic balance between Saudi Arabia and Iran while also attempting, along with China, to help them stick to their détente.

This scenario is also deeply vulnerable to the Zionist regime’s policies of expelling and exterminating Palestinians and expanding security zones in Lebanon and Syria, forcing a response from Iran.

Sunni Exclusionary Alliance

In this medium-probability, high-volatility scenario, Iran and the US reach a comprehensive deal that opens up economic and political space for Iran to grow its military and civilian potential and emerge as a much stronger rival to the Zionist state.

Given the Zionist entity’s threat perception and Iran’s response, this scenario allows Iran to implement its forward defence strategy more aggressively, making the Gulf states even more wary of its intentions and capabilities. Seeing this development, the US rethinks its Iran strategy and begins to re-apply pressure on Tehran.

Regional diplomacy breaks down and the Gulf monarchies link up with the US-Zionist duo to form an expanded, exclusionary Sunni defence pact. This architecture brings together Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Bahrain, Kuwait and the UAE, with Qatar and Oman staying neutral by the skin of their teeth.

This alliance explicitly excludes Iran and frames it as the sole regional adversary. Rather than achieving collective security, it triggers a classic security dilemma. Iran, feeling encircled, responds by strengthening its strategic partnership with Russia and China, further increasing its asymmetric support for its Axis of Resistance allies in Iraq, Syria and Yemen, and accelerating its nuclear enrichment to achieve a functional deterrent. The fiscal space it enjoys allows it a better hand to respond to this development.

The region returns to high polarisation with hot and cold war episodes, characterised by frequent cyber warfare, maritime sabotage in the straits of Hormuz and Bab al-Mandab and high-intensity proxy conflicts across the Levant.

This is also a nightmarish scenario for Pakistan, whose interest and security are intrinsically linked to peace in west Asia and the Middle East.

Pan-Gulf Concert

In this low-probability, high-impact scenario, a profound shift in political will occurs. The current war and subsequent developments lead to a realisation among the Gulf states that an unmitigated war would cause mutual economic destruction. Facilitated by neutral mediators like Pakistan and backed by a joint UN-China diplomatic initiative, the regional powers establish a truly inclusive Persian Gulf Security and Cooperation Council.

This architecture includes all six GCC states, Iraq and Iran, with Turkiye and Pakistan acting as external observer guarantors. Modelled loosely on the 1975 Helsinki Accords, the member states sign a binding treaty regarding non-interference in their domestic affairs, respect for territorial integrity, and the renunciation of cross-border asymmetric warfare.

A joint maritime monitoring centre is established in Muscat to secure the Strait of Hormuz, and a hotline is set up between Riyadh and Tehran. In this scenario, the Zionist regime is strategically contained, the US transitions to an offshore balancer role, and the region experiences sustained stability, enabling long-term economic integration and the mutual development of regional energy infrastructure.

This scenario also allows the region to put collective pressure on the Zionists to roll back their illegal occupation of parts of Lebanon and Syria and return to the table on the question of Palestine. The collective bargaining power of the region, in combination with the hits the Zionists have taken for their genocidal policies, will ensure outcomes that were/are currently not available.

CONCLUSION

Going forward, the US posture towards the Gulf and Zionist policies remain critical variables. Despite long-term rhetoric about a pivot to Asia to counter China, Washington’s actions demonstrate a deep reluctance to leave the region.

During his tours of the Gulf, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio explicitly signalled that Washington regards the Gulf as a vital theatre for global energy security and maritime trade enforcement. Within this framework, the tenor of US-Iran relations under an emerging collective security conversation would likely be characterised in the foreseeable future by managed hostility and structural mistrust rather than a grand bargain or a slide into total war.

The US cannot easily abandon its decades-old sanctions regime or its commitment to preventing an Iranian nuclear breakout. Washington will continue to view Iran’s growing military capabilities and the network of regional allies as direct threats to international shipping and regional stability.

There can be many more scenarios. But one factor should be clear: any arrangement that seeks to stabilise the region must transition from exclusionary containment models towards inclusive frameworks that engage Iran, while managing the deep-seated structural and sectarian divisions that define the local political landscape. Simultaneously, the US will have to rethink its relations with the Zionists and withdraw the carte blanche it has granted to that entity.

Until these foundational requirements are met (there’s no real indication that they will be), the region will remain highly volatile and susceptible to vertical and horizontal conflict escalation.

The writer is a journalist interested in security and
foreign policies. X: @ejazhaider

Published in Dawn, EOS, July 5th, 2026

His remarks came after he met with Croatia’s Minister of Foreign and European Affairs Gordan Grlić Radman, who is in Islamabad on a one-day visit.

Addressing a joint press briefing with Radman, Dar said, “Both Pakistan and Croatia are situated at important geographical locations and could utilise their presence and locations to untap their enormous potential for growth between the two countries and beyond.”

Dar said he briefed Radman on the “potential, capacity, facilities and connectivity of our Karachi port”. “Both sides discussed the possibility of collaborative arrangements between the ports of the two countries,” he added.

The deputy PM noted that connectivity “lies at the heart of a vision for sustainable development, regional stability and global economic integration”.

Dar described the discussions between the two sides held earlier in the day as “warm, constructive and wide-ranging”, adding that both sides reviewed the entire spectrum of Pakistan-Croatia relations.

They “agreed to undertake steps to inject greater momentum to our political and economic relations as well as to enhance our cooperation in all other areas of mutual interest, including trade, investment, development, agriculture, labour mobility, education, defence, via facilitation, climate change, tourism, infrastructure, IT, seaport collaboration, etc”, he said.

Islamabad and Zagreb decided to make a memorandum of understanding (MoU) on bilateral political consultation between their foreign ministries “fully functional and hold the consultation on a regular periodic basis”.

Subsequently, Dar announced Pakistan’s offer to hold the first round of consultations in the last quarter of 2026 or first quarter of 2027.

Speaking on economic collaboration, the deputy premier said both sides “concurred that our bilateral trade remains below its potential”.

“We appreciated the rising trend in bilateral trade volume,” he said, adding that the two countries agreed to “revitalise bilateral economic and trade relations, including through B2B (business-to-business) exchanges for common benefit”.

“We also considered holding a B2B trade forum in the future between the two business communities,” he said.

Dar said he hailed the presence of Croatian companies in Pakistan and invited the other side to “benefit from Pakistan’s favourable investment policies”.

Dar affirmed that Pakistan’s access to the European Union’s (EU) Generalised Scheme of Preferences Plus (GSP+) “remains a cornerstone of Pakistan-EU economic cooperation and a mutually beneficial framework”.

Taking note of a new GSP+ regulation set to enter into force on Jan 1, 2027, Dar said he informed Radman that Islamabad has “already initiated preparatory work for our reapplication in early 2027”.

The two foreign ministers also “agreed to the early finalisation of various agreements and MoUs under process between our two countries”.

Dar further said that the two sides were “working together to expedite the opening of a Croatian visa processing facility in Islamabad”, as applicants currently have to go to Tehran for it. He noted that Radman gave him a “very positive response” to his request for a facility in Islamabad or an alternative.

The Deputy PM said he and Radman discussed ways to strengthen cooperation between the agricultural and research institutes of the two countries. He also invited a department from the University of Zagreb to visit Taxila, the “greatest cosmopolitan centre of learning in the ancient world”.

At the outset of his address, Dar noted that Radman’s trip was the first high-level visit from Croatia to Pakistan in a “long time” and marked an important step in strengthening bilateral relations.

He said Radman was the longest-serving foreign minister of Croatia and played a “key role” in his country’s membership of the EU and Nato.

Potential for collaboration between ports discussed

Earlier in the day, Dar and Radman discussed the possibilities and potential for collaboration between the ports of their countries, the Foreign Office (FO) said.

According to the FO, the two sides discussed ways to strengthen ties in the field of trade, investment, agriculture, labour mobility, visa facilitation, education, defence, climate change, tourism, infrastructure and information technology.

“They also exchanged views on various facets of Pakistan-EU cooperation as well as regional and global issues of interest,” it said.

“Recognising that connectivity lies at the heart of sustainable development, regional stability, and global economic integration, the two sides discussed the possibilities and potential for collaboration between the ports of Pakistan and Croatia,” it added.

“Both sides agreed to hold bilateral political consultations during the current year or early 2027,” it said, adding that the visit marked an important step in strengthening relations between the two countries.

Addressing delegation-level talks during televised remarks, Dar said that the EU was among Pakistan’s top trading partners, adding that Croatia was a “strong member” of the union.

“We are committed to deepening Pakistan’s engagement with Croatia for a sustainable bilateral partnership and closer cooperation within the EU framework,” he said.

He recalled that the EU’s top diplomat, Kaja Kallas, had recently visited Pakistan.

“We have wonderful relations with the EU leadership. We remained in contact during the India-Pakistan war,” he said, referring to last year’s brief military conflict.

He said that he had invited Radman and Kallas to visit Pakistan at the same time, thanking them both for accepting.

In his remarks, Radman thanked Dar for the invitation and said he was pleased to be making his first official visit to Pakistan.

He said the “talks provided an opportunity to review bilateral relations and explore ways to expand cooperation, particularly in the areas of trade, economy, and business”.

Describing ties between the two countries as “excellent”, Radman said there was “still room to further strengthen cooperation”.

Referring to conflicts in the Middle East and Ukraine, he stressed the importance of international solidarity at a time of growing global challenges, saying “countries must uphold international law, respect humanitarian principles and work together to address regional and international crises”.

The Croatian minister also welcomed Pakistan’s diplomatic efforts to promote dialogue and de-escalation in the Middle East, saying initiatives aimed at advancing peace and stability in the region were important.

He also congratulated Dar on Pakistan’s role in supporting diplomatic engagement and expressed support for efforts to encourage peaceful solutions to ongoing conflicts.

PM calls for expanding bilateral cooperation

Radman also called on Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif during his visit, with the latter calling for expanding bilateral cooperation in trade, investment, information technology, connectivity, agriculture, tourism and skilled manpower.

According to the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO), Radman praised Pakistan’s role in promoting regional peace during the meeting.

During the meeting, the prime minister said Pakistan enjoyed friendly relations with Croatia, “marked by cordiality, mutual respect and shared interest,” the statement said.

“He expressed Pakistan’s desire to further strengthen bilateral cooperation, particularly through enhanced trade and investment, information technology, connectivity, agriculture, tourism and skilled manpower,” it added.

While conveying his warm regards and good wishes to President Zoran Milanovic and Prime Minister Andrej Plenkovic, PM Shehbaz “extended a cordial invitation to both leaders to undertake official visits to Pakistan, at their kind convenience,” the PMO said.

The Croatian minister thanked PM Shehbaz for the warm welcome and said he was “honoured to visit Islamabad” and congratulated Pakistan and its leadership “on playing a prominent role in regional peace efforts”.

He also expressed his government’s desire to enhance Pakistan-Croatia ties “in all areas of mutual interest,” the statement added.