The commercialisation of low Earth orbit (LEO) broadband has upended the old order. When Starlink first engaged with PTA in December 2021, there was no framework to govern it since PTA’s categories were mostly terrestrial and Suparco’s mandate was research. To address this, the National Space Policy was approved in December 2023, followed by the Pakistan Space Activities Regulatory Board (PSARB) rules two months later. The PTA’s licensing framework, finalised by April 2026, then made satellite broadband a licence category for the first time.

The new licence allows broadband, backhaul, bandwidth provision, and corporate intranet, while explicitly excluding direct-to-device, mobile satellite service, Earth stations in motion, and broadcasting. That means, at least for now, don’t expect connectivity on a Karachi-Islamabad flight or your phone catching a signal where there’s no tower. To be fair, most markets treat these as separate licence categories rather than lumping them into one permit.

To offer services, every LEO operator obviously has to be locally incorporated and licensed. More critically, they are required to build a gateway earth station on Pakistani soil within 18 months, route all domestic traffic through it, and keep user data in-country.

The final piece remaining is the detailed regulatory framework

By design, a LEO network with inter-satellite laser links has no natural point to tap: traffic can hop from one satellite to another and come down anywhere. Forcing it through a gateway inside Pakistan is what enables interception and content-blocking. This brings us to another critical requirement: the licence requires an interception capability live before launch. In plain English, the operator must build a system that lets law enforcement agencies monitor a specific user’s traffic on request.

Big brother-y as it may be, it’s not exactly novel. Every mobile operator and internet service provider (ISP) in the country is already bound by the same rules; the difference is that terrestrial traffic is already domestic and tappable, whereas LEOs need the gateways and data localisation to enable it in the first place. For context, most countries — be it India, Bangladesh or the US — have identical requirements for satellite operators.

As for the commercial terms, there is a one-time licence fee of $500,000 and about 2.5 per cent of annual gross revenue in recurring charges, which includes spectrum charges and the Universal Service Fund contributions. On top of that, there’s a separate 6pc levy into a Strategic Plans Division-controlled research fund for space development, translating into an aggregate take of roughly 8.5pc, compared with about 4pc in India and 3-5.5pc in Bangladesh.

Moreover, the Fixed Satellite Services explicitly carves out Azad Jammu & Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan from the licensed area altogether. Ironically, these happen to be the regions where the case for satellite is quite strong, characterised by weak infrastructure, sparse towers, remote valleys and border settlements where fibre deployment will be tough.

Security is the obvious objection, as these are sensitive areas bordering a hostile neighbour and thus can be tricky places to allow a foreign constellation an open channel. However, we are far from the only country to deal with such a situation. India kept its border areas inside the framework and roped in additional controls instead — monitoring zones within 50km of the border, geo-fenced and location-locked terminals, and the power to suspend service during hostilities.

Currently, the process also looks quite complicated and time-consuming. After incorporation with the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan, the operator must be cleared by the PSARB to utilise Pakistani space and subsequently obtain the relevant operational licence from the PTA, while the Frequency Allocation Board of Pakistan assigns spectrum.

Even more critical is the question of who will administer the rules. Consider the PSARB board, where five out of eight seats are reserved for the security and space establishments — including three Suparco officials and a co-opted Inter-Services Intelligence member — alongside two civilian ministry reps. Meanwhile, private-sector, academic or telecom-industry representation is completely missing.

This potentially creates a major conflict of interest, as Suparco, which runs PSARB’s secretariat, is also the operator of PAKSAT and holds the first right of refusal, ie government bodies must use PAKSAT before seeking connectivity from anyone else. In other words, a competitor has been entrusted as the regulator and is currently in charge of authorising the rules of the game.

Contrast this with India, where licensing was vested in a newly created body, the Indian National Space Promotion and Authorisation Centre, separate from the Indian Space Research Organisation, which gets one seat. An industry figure chairs it and answers up a civilian chain to the prime minister’s office. Bangladesh took an even simpler approach, granting powers to the existing telecom regulator instead of forming a dedicated space authority, and sped up Starlink’s launch in seven months.

Despite this, global operators have shown keen interest in participating. At least four are actively seeking a licence — Starlink, Amazon’s Kuiper and China’s Qianfan among them. Preliminary conversations with them point to a broad willingness to play by the rules even where they chafe: demands such as local gateways, data storage, and lawful interception have generally been accepted in markets like Nigeria and Bangladesh.

The commercial rollout requires the final piece of the jigsaw, ie the detailed regulatory framework by the PSARB. For this, it has engaged the services of the London-headquartered Access Partnership, which submitted its recommendations a while back. But months have passed while the document now bites the dust on the desk of the powers that be. In the meantime, the rest of us are probably busy on our 20 Mbps internet connection.

Abdul Aziz Malik is an ex-analyst at Data Darbar
and Mutaher Khan is co-founder of Data Darbar

Published in Dawn, The Business and Finance Weekly, September 7th, 2026

For reference, the total cumulative issuance of semi-annual floating Pakistan Investment Bonds increased from less than Rs1 trillion in 2020 to more than Rs14tr in 2024, and is currently more than Rs22tr. Floating rate instruments constitute approximately 70 per cent of all domestic sovereign debt. The debt portfolio’s Average Time to Maturity (ATM) is near 3.9 years, while Average Time to Refix (ATR) stands just above one year. This leads to a vicious cycle of repricing: price increases immediately upset fiscal accounts.

The conventional economic theory believes price spirals are the result of excess aggregate demand that the State Bank of Pakistan can tame by raising interest rates. However, Pakistan has high cost-push, structural, and import-driven inflation. The recurring price spirals are mainly on the supply side and are the result of sudden currency devaluation, global commodity shocks, frequent revisions of administered energy tariffs to offset energy sector circular debt and domestic food supply bottlenecks.

In this structural context, the monetary policy measures taken by the State Bank of Pakistan are certainly needed. In the absence of a hawkish monetary policy amid an inflationary wave, inflationary expectations quickly get out of hand, second-round wage-price spirals set in, and exchange rate pressures build up, potentially leading to an uncontained macroeconomic spiral. But the central bank’s tightening directly affects the most important channel that links inflation to an overwhelming fiscal burden: the domestic cost of debt.

The government should continue to work on structural reprofiling to address the sovereign portfolio’s repricing sensitivity

The correlation between debt servicing and headline inflation in the period 2006-16 was negligible and became moderate to strong post the 2022-23 spiral. The central bank’s rate hike to tackle price shocks reprices the government’s huge domestic floating debt stock. This means that the policy rate hikes get quickly and vigorously passed on through the sovereign debt portfolio to fiscal expenditures. This transmission is a delayed pass-through, with the sensitivity of debt servicing being highest after two to three quarters as floating instruments reprice at successive auctions.

The costs of servicing the debt take up a large share of the federal budget. Despite three consecutive years of contractionary fiscal policy delivering consistent primary surpluses, debt servicing consumes 40 per cent of the federal budget. The government had no choice but to cut development spending and investment in productive capital.

An anti-price policy, used to control prices, ends up increasing fiscal pressure, deteriorating the composition of public finances, and consuming public investments that can no longer be used for long-term structural productivity spending.

This structural problem would need to be significantly addressed by improving sovereign debt indicators. The Debt Management Office has achieved good results in the past few years, with its efforts to reprofile domestic maturities, increase fixed-rate debt issuances, and extend the average maturity of the public debt stock. However, the sovereign portfolio is still quite sensitive to repricing risk.

Added to these fiscal weaknesses are the severe climate and geopolitical vulnerabilities facing Pakistan. It is still one of the most climate-sensitive countries in the world and continues to suffer from devastating floods, heatwaves, and yield losses that displace millions of people, destroy infrastructure, trigger food inflation, and erode fiscal buffers.

The current adaptation and mitigation actions are not adequate in view of the magnitude of the challenge. There is an urgent need to build dedicated infrastructure for climate change adaptation, modernise water management, improve storage logistics, and make agriculture climate-smart in Pakistan to reduce vulnerability to frequent environmental shocks.

At the same time, Pakistan has to deal with its extreme geoeconomic vulnerabilities in a fracturing global order. The domestic economy is highly vulnerable to cross-border commodity price fluctuations, given its high reliance on imported fuel. The geopolitical and climate vulnerabilities have resulted in stagflationary pressures, leading to severe episodes of macroeconomic instability.

The need to protect the economy requires proactive fiscal measures to overcome acute climate and geopolitical vulnerabilities, as recurring price spirals are not the result of runaway domestic demand but of price disruptions from outside the economy.

State agencies need to invest in climate-smart agricultural infrastructure, streamline storage logistics, and limit dependence on imported energy to shield the real economy from likely and unpredictable supply-side shocks. The Debt Management Office, on the other hand, should continue working on structural reprofiling, which involves increasing the proportion of fixed-rate debt and lengthening debt maturities, to address the sovereign portfolio’s repricing sensitivity.

The government has to address these structural and debt-market fault lines, so that conventional monetary interventions will no longer exacerbate the sovereign’s fiscal difficulties.

Khanzaib Ahmad is a co-developer of the Monetary Policy Uncertainty Index for Pakistan and an analyst at Chase Securities. Abdul Moeez Mirza is a research assistant at IBA School of Business Studies

Published in Dawn, The Business and Finance Weekly, September 7th, 2026

However, Gwadar is in Balochistan, Pakistan’s poorest province with a history of insurgency. Even though Gwadar was hailed as the crown jewel of CPEC and a game-changer for Pakistan, it has been anything but a success. Although it has been more than a decade since the CPEC announcement, the small town continues to be devoid of any major business or economic enterprises.

Over the years, news has trickled in about slowing CPEC momentum, as Beijing is concerned about the safety of its people working on these schemes in Pakistan. Chinese workers and installations have been repeatedly targeted by the outlawed Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) terrorists since 2018, both within Balochistan and outside the province. As recently as January 31, the BLA launched coordinated terrorist attacks across 12 districts of Balochistan, including Quetta and the Gwadar district.

China’s persistence in Balochistan, despite security challenges and a lack of profitability, reflects its long-term geopolitical thinking

Yet, China continues to finance and build infrastructure in Gwadar. Examples include the $168 million Eastbay Expressway, which connects the main port to the Makran Coastal Highway, and the New Gwadar International Airport built for $320m. Said to be the largest airport in the country, it was inaugurated with much fanfare in January 2025. Oddly, this grand infrastructure remains inactive.

Profit fallacy

Beijing’s persistence in Balochistan, despite security challenges and a lack of profitability, reflects its long-term geopolitical thinking. Aasim Sajjad Akhtar, an Islamabad-based political economy professor and author, argues that this massive capital expenditure represents a deliberate and irreversible footprint. “Beijing has spent extravagantly in Gwadar, and there is a ‘sunk cost’ that they have incurred,” he notes, framing the project as part of “a grand design” to secure vital access to the Straits of Malacca and Hormuz.

This is a part of a broader, systemic Chinese global maritime strategy. For instance, Sri Lanka’s Hambantota port opened in 2010 and was financed by China, but it has since been underused and marred by security concerns and protests. According to a report in The Guardian, Beijing may be planning to host future naval bases at Hambantota, Bata in Equatorial Guinea, and Gwadar “to protect shipping routes and strengthen its ability to resist sanctions from the US and its allies”.

Gwadar serves primarily as geopolitical insurance, a logistics, energy and naval hub optimised for long-term strategic resilience rather than short-term commercial profitability, notes Peter Frankopan, a professor of global history at Oxford University.

Gwadar is strategically situated at the mouth of the Strait of Hormuz. For Beijing, the Gwadar port has evolved over the years into a security-driven partnership, highly influenced by the establishment and China’s strategic interests. Moreover, with the recent US-Iran war, the strait — a key shipping channel through which a fifth of the world’s oil and gas normally passed — has assumed global importance.

High security enclave

In this heavily securitised space, thousands of Chinese workers live and work in isolation, cut off from the local population. Infrastructure development in Gwadar has prioritised areas around the main port, exemplified by the Eastbay Expressway, which has harmed the livelihoods of the fishing communities by preventing them from openly accessing the Arabian Sea.

This expressway has left the locals resentful and deeply mistrustful. In the words of local fishermen, development in the port town is for the Chinese, not for them, which is a sentiment many echo in Gwadar. Nasir Rahim Sohrabi, a local social activist, points out the hollowness behind this so-called development: “If there is torrential rain in Gwadar, the entire town is submerged in water.”

In April, Pakistani officials were thrilled when two cargo ships, the MV HOM Leader and the MV Dolphin 103, docked at Gwadar port. The chairman of the port went so far as to say that it was contributing to increased economic activity, while the mainstream media drummed up news reports suggesting the US-Iran war and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz could prove a boon for Gwadar port.

The US-Iran conflict and the subsequent closure of the Strait of Hormuz provided the harbour with an unexpected benefit. Because Gwadar is situated next to Iran, it offers the shortest maritime transit route to Iran and Central Asia. Capitalising on this opportunity, Pakistan’s Maritime Affairs Minister Junaid Chaudhry announced major tariff reductions at the port to encourage international transit trade.

However, because this situation has emerged solely due to the war and Gulf instability, it highlights shifting regional dynamics, especially Beijing’s growing indirect role in the US-Iran conflict. Ultimately, Gwadar is highly likely to become central to Beijing’s strategic interests and assertions in the Indian Ocean.

The writer is a Dawn staffer

Published in Dawn, The Business and Finance Weekly, September 7th, 2026

KARACHI/HYDERABAD: After a journey of more than six hours, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Chief Minister Sohail Afridi finally reached the Karachi Toll Plaza in the early hours of Monday, with his convoy negotiating blockades, dug-up roads, and other hurdles that the party alleged were placed by the government to stop or delay his arrival.

The long-awaited arrival of the CM Afridi-led caravan from Hyderabad and Umerkot triggered scenes of celebration at the Toll Plaza where a crowd of PTI supporters, including women and children, had gathered to welcome them as fireworks lit up the night sky and jubilant workers raised slogans in their support.

The chief minister was accompanied by PTI Sindh president Haleem Adil Sheikh and other party leaders on the last leg of his five-day public mobilisation campaign in Sindh for the Sept 27 nationwide protest call to demand the hospitalisation and release of incarcerated ex-premier Imran Khan.

Before leaving Hyderabad for Karachi on Sunday evening, CM Afridi had accused the Sindh government of creating hurdles in his march and vowed that he would not leave the province without launching the ‘free Imran Khan’ movement with his rally in the port city. “If we cannot reach Karachi today, God willing, we will hold the rally tomorrow; if not tomorrow, then the day after. I will not take a single step out of Sindh without launching a street movement in Karachi. I will stay here until the objective is achieved.”

The PTI, however, had to change the venue of its planned rally from Mazar-i-Quaid to the Karachi Toll Plaza to ensure that the leadership and workers could reach the gathering.

PTI’s Sindh chapter spokesperson Muhammad Ali Baloch alleged that containers, vehicles and other barriers had been placed along the route leading to Mazar-i-Quaid, besides at several locations at the Kotri bridge. He said PTI workers from across Karachi had gathered at the Toll Plaza, where the party had prepared a stage and a truck for the gathering.

Separately, Karachi’s District East police, in a statement, said that “no public gatherings, rallies or processions will be allowed around Mazar-i-Quaid”.

‘No dispute over gathering’

Karachi Mayor Murtaza Wahab, who is also a spokesman for the Sindh government rejected the allegations that the arrangements were specifically aimed at PTI and said the party was free to come to the metropolitan city provided it followed the law. He told the media there was no disagreement with PTI members over the gathering, but warned that “no one should take the law into their own hands”.

He said the administration routinely makes security and traffic arrangements, including placing containers and imposing restrictions on roads, whenever a large political gathering takes place.

The mayor was responding to the allegations levelled by the PTI that the Sindh government had erected roadblocks to prevent the party’s convoy from reaching Karachi for the rally. Speaking from the convoy’s route, the party’s Sindh chapter president Haleem Adil Sheikh said the CM and other leaders were travelling through “remote and deserted” rural roads after facing repeated obstructions and vowed that PTI workers would reach Karachi despite the restrictions.

“We are removing the barriers and moving forward. Karachi, wait for us, we are coming,” he said. He claimed that the convoy had been held up for around four hours en route to Karachi from Hyderabad and alleged that officials had removed their vehicle’s tyres while police took away its driver.

Rally in Hyderabad

Earlier, addressing a gathering in Hyderabad, the KP CM lashed out at the Punjab chief minister for making a controversial statement against smaller provinces, wherein she said Punjab faced internal threats instead of threats from across the border.

“Punjab CM should tender an apology for her statement,” he said, while also seeking a “clarification” from the Pakistan Army’s media spokesperson. Addressing the ISPR director general, he said, “You tell us that India is our enemy but the one you got elected is saying India is not a threat to her. Please tell us who is right?”

He also said only two families were ruling Pakistan — one from Sindh and the other from Punjab — but it was only the PTI whose leader Imran Khan picked an ordinary worker like him as the chief minister. He said the PTI’s mandate was stolen in the Feb 2024 elections.

The KP CM also urged the youth to stand up for the country and for themselves because the future belonged to them. He also urged them to join the Sept 27 movement. “Will you join us on Sept 27 because people say there will be bullets? I am ready for it and are you ready?” he roared.

Earlier, he addressed a rally at Allah Wala Chowk in Umerkot, where he arrived six hours behind schedule. He called upon his party supporters to come out on Sept 27 if the PTI faced repression, saying they had to stand firm for their future and that of their children.

A.B. Arisar in Umerkot also contributed to this report

Published in Dawn, September 7th, 2026

While some believe the president travelled to Lon­don solely for a medical check-up, others view the visit as a political move aimed at putting pressure on the government.

An official video clip of Mr Naqvi’s meeting with President Zardari also generated discussion about the president’s position. After all, it was the interior minister who ignited the fresh debate through his diatribe about the collapse of the existing governance sys­tem, and called for a ‘reset’.

Following his London sojourn, Mr Naqvi rece­ntly doubled down on his dem­and for new administrative units. Addressing a National Policy Dia­logue on ‘Devol­ution of Powers and Good Governance in Pakistan’ at the University of Management and Tech­n­o­logy on Saturday, Mr Naqvi clarified that his proposed “reset” did not mean a change of government or political party, rather a comprehensive review and restructuring of the administrative system to make it responsive to the needs of citizens.

He even called for a debate on granting provincial status to Islamabad, saying residents of the federal capital did not receive a share under the National Finance Commission (NFC) award.

‘Apolitical’ trip

The president’s meeting with the interior minister was followed by gatherings of senior PPP leaders with Mr Zardari in London and, subsequently, the passage of a resolution by the Sindh Assembly rejecting the creation of new provinces.

The sequence of events has led to speculation that the PPP’s position was discussed during the London meetings and that the Sindh Assembly resolution was adopted with the president’s consent.

The issue of President Zardari’s ‘Euro trip’ and his meeting with the interior minister and Law Minister Azam Nazeer Tarar was also raised at last week’s Foreign Office briefing. However, the FO spokesperson did not respond, instead referring the question to the Presidency.

When contacted, President Zardari’s spokesperson Murtaza Solangi told Dawn he was unaware of the details of the president’s visit, or when he would return to the country.

“It is solely a private visit. I never seek details of his private visits,” he said.

PPP Secretary General Nayyar Hussain Bokhari also maintained that the president had travelled to London only for a medical check-up and that there was nothing political about the trip.

Responding to a question about Mr Zardari’s meeting with Mr Naqvi, he said the interior minister had maintained a close association with the president for a long time.

“There was nothing serious if the minister met Zardari sahib to inquire about his health,” he said.

Another PPP source, however, confirmed that the president’s visit had reasons beyond his medical treatment.

PPP leaders meet Zardari

The source said that PPP Chairman Bilawal Bhutto-Zardari, Senator Saleem Mandviwalla and Dr Asim Hussain, considered close confidants of the president, also joined him later in the UK.

“President Zardari has conveyed a clear message to the government through passage of a resolution in Sindh Assembly that he and his party ruling in Sindh reject any plan to create new provinces,” the source said.

According to the source, the PPP had initially agreed in principle to the creation of two new provinces in Punjab — south Punjab and Bahawalpur — but changed its position after the government began considering the creation of new federating units in all four existing provinces.

The party subsequently opposed the broader proposal, and has recently questioned Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif’s silence on the politically sensitive issue of creating new provinces and sought a clear position from him.

The party had initially not opposed the idea of creating additional federating units, but insisted that any such move should be undertaken in accordance with the procedure prescribed by the Constitution.

Now, it is openly opposing the proposal, with the PPP-led Sindh government securing passage of a resolution in the provincial assembly rejecting any further division of the country’s four existing provinces.

The development is politically significant because, although the PML-N-led government enjoys a two-thirds majority in the National Assembly, it relies on PPP support.

If the PPP withdraws that support, imp­lementing any constitutional amendment aimed at creating new provinces would become considerably more difficult.

IPP chief slams govt

Adding to the growing criticism from within the ruling coalition, Comm­uni­cations Minister Abdul Aleem Khan, who belongs to another government ally, the Istehkam-i-Pakistan Party (IPP), also criticised the government on Sunday over what he described as its poor performance.

He said people were not being provided with basic necessities and that no one who genuinely loved the country could be satisfied with the existing system.

Mr Khan pointed to shortages of clean drinking water, deteriorating hospitals and the large number of children deprived of education. He also highlighted the poor condition of schools across the country.

In a message on X, Mr Khan said people remained deprived of basic facilities while their hardships were increasing day by day.

“If the provinces were delivering effectively under the existing system, why would the people be in such a condition?” he asked.

He said there was a need to set aside prejudice and examine the actual condition of the people, arguing that the public was frustrated and deprived of basic amenities.

Published in Dawn, September 7th, 2026