While reaffirming support for Saudi Arabia on Thursday, and terming the situation around Bab al-Mandeb “exceptionally serious”, the Foreign Office said that “dialogue and diplomacy” were required, not “coercive measures”. This should answer questions pertaining to Pakistan’s commitments regarding its defence pacts with the kingdom. Though Islamabad remains committed to Riyadh’s security, at this time it supports a negotiated settlement to the conflict with the pro-Iran Houthis.

It is a logical position for Pakistan to take, for while Saudi Arabia’s security is important, it would be unwise to jump into an open-ended quagmire. The region’s recent history supports this position. Saudi Arabia and the UAE — with Western military support — had been unable to dislodge the Houthis since the Saudi military campaign began in 2015, and in 2022, Riyadh opted for a ceasefire, which has now collapsed.

To simply dub the Houthis Iranian ‘proxies’ is simplistic. While the Zaidi Shia movement has strong ties to Iran, it is an indigenous Yemeni group with centuries-old cultural and political roots in their homeland, and the support of local tribes, particularly in the north. Therefore, it cannot be bombed into oblivion. Any solution to the Yemeni imbroglio must involve the Houthis.

The humanitarian situation in Yemen itself is dire. Nearly 100,000 people have been uprooted in the latest round of fighting, while the UN says that around 20m people require aid as they have to contend with “acute hunger”. Yemen’s health system has also collapsed due to the never-ending war. Externally, the closure of Bab al-Mandeb by the Houthis could deliver a painful blow to an already frail global economy. And if the conflict draws in other regional states, the situation could transform into a dangerous maelstrom.

Hence, any call for dialogue makes sense. There are reports that the Saudis have sought talks with the Houthis via Oman. Hopefully, this channel can deliver positive results and lead to a halt in fighting. For long-term peace, the Houthis must pledge to keep Bab al-Mandeb open for all, and stop their attacks on Saudi Arabia. In return, the kingdom must lift its blockade of Houthi-held territory.

Once calm is established, talks can begin for a broad-based Yemeni government, which incorporates all the country’s tribal and confessional stakeholders. Ultimately, any peace agreement must guarantee the security of both Yemen and Saudi Arabia, and lead to an inclusive system where all Yemeni parties are accommodated.

Published in Dawn, September 19th, 2026

The foremost reason is the curse of political discontinuity. When prime minister Imran Khan unveiled Pakistan’s first-ever NSP in January 2022, it was hailed as a revolutionary pivot towards a citizen-centric geo-economic future. Yet, just months later, the predictable wheel of Pakistani political instability turned, and with the ouster of the PTI government, the strategic document was promptly relegated to bureaucratic limbo. It seems that in Pakistan’s deeply polarised political landscape, structural continuity is a luxury. Successive administrations traditionally suffer from a profound ‘ownership gap’, and view the policy blueprints of their predecessors with suspicion. This does not mean that the incoming coalition government ripped up the NSP. Rather, the subsequent administrations of the PDM alliance and then the PML-N-led coalition found itself completely consumed by the base instincts of political survival and immediate fiscal fires. These priorities diluted institutional focus and shifted the national priority from long-term economic integration to immediate to short-term emergency bailouts.

Secondly, a viable geo-economic vision cannot survive in a fortress state. Rather, it demands liberalised trade policies, open borders, and a hyper-competitive export sector. But Islamabad remains wedded to an inward-looking protective regime, that maintains high tariffs on intermediate inputs averaging eight per cent, which is twice as high as Indian and Bangladeshi standards, effectively cutting off Pakistan’s industries from global value chains. This protectionism has pushed Pakistan’s export capacity against a hard structural ceiling, rendering regional competitive advantage remarkably weak. When the NSP was introduced, Pakistan’s total exports had reached a record $39.52 billion. Yet, while the policy promised a geo-economic turnaround to boost these numbers, subsequent years brought severe political instability and soaring energy tariffs that caused total exports to contract.

Third, for Pakistan, a fractured and hostile neighbourhood is a major constraint in realising its geo-economic strategy. Even the most robust economic policies are ultimately at the mercy of geography. The regional assumptions that underpinned Pakistan’s first-ever NSP collapsed almost as soon as the ink dried. At the time of the NSP’s release, there was cautious optimism in the strategic community of Islamabad. Backchannel diplomacy with India had successfully culminated in a 2021 understanding to ‘strictly observe’ a ceasefire along the Line of Control. This development indicated a slow path towards normalisation despite the scar of the 2019 Pulwama-Balakot crisis. However, New Delhi’s uncompromising policy of refusing any structural dialogue effectively froze the eastern front for Pakistan. Furthermore, New Delhi’s subsequent decision to hold the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty in abeyance, coupled with the intense four-day armed hostilities of May 2025, has effectively slammed the door on any lingering hopes for normalisation in the foreseeable future.

A viable geo-economic vision cannot survive in a fortress state.

Simultaneously, Islamabad’s grand calculations on its western border have turned to dust. The initial hope that the Afghan Taliban regime in Kabul would secure transit corridors to Central Asia was quickly shattered. Instead of acting as a cooperative partner, Kabul chose to prioritise its ideological fraternity with the TTP over its relationship with Islamabad. This policy decision of the Taliban regime plunged the Pak-Afghan border into a volatile cycle of skirmishes, trade closures, and a sev­ere domestic security crisis that completely derai­led the NSP’s transit-hub ambitions. Resultantly, bilateral commerce between Pakistan and Afghanistan, Afghan transit trade volume via Pakistan, and third-country exports through Pakistan contracted sharply. Adding to this paralysis, Pakistan’s southwestern frontier remains structurally locked. While the diplomatic relationship with Iran has managed to be stable and progressive, the pervasive American sanctions regime has severely strangled any realistic potential to further enhance economic ties with Tehran.

Pakistan’s geo-economic vision cannot be realised until Islamabad radically restructures its domestic priorities and foreign policy architecture on three major fronts. First and foremost, Islamabad must insulate its core economic strategy from the volatile swings of its political cycles. This demands a rare moment of political maturity, where cross-party consensus elevates econo­mic diplomacy to a non-partisan national objecti­­ve and ensures that a change at the Prime Minister’s Office doesn’t translate into abandonment of the country’s long-term economic roadmap.

Second, Islamabad must formally divorce its economy from its security apparatus, and treat them as separate, independent domains so that trade channels are never again sacrificed to the knee-jerk impulses of geopolitical friction. Instead of attempting a grand, macro-level regional integration that is easily checked by state-level hostility, Islamabad must pivot towards a bottom-up approach that maximises its leverage by creating dedicated border economic zones and automated, high-tech transit terminals with its eastern and western neighbours.

Third, to transition from a security state to a true citizen-centric development state, Pakistan must boldly address its structural bottlenecks. This means dismantling the protectionist tariff walls that stifle innovation, aggressively diversifying the low-tech export basket beyond textiles, and creating a stable, predictable regulatory environment capable of attracting genuine foreign direct investment. Regionally, while the geopolitical landscape remains treacherous, Islamabad cannot afford to be economically isolated. It must leverage its strategic partnership with Beijing to optimise the next phase of CPEC, while simultaneously utilising creative, localised trade arrangements with Kabul and Delhi, where formal diplomatic breakthroughs remain stalled.

Islamabad must realise that, while it has regained significant strategic importance in the Middle East, and beyond to some extent, it finds itself increasingly isolated within its own region. To fix this, Pakistan must fundamentally rethink its regional and domestic policies so it can truly benefit from its renewed global influence and turn its geo-economic objectives into lasting economic growth.

The writer is a strategic analyst of international security. The views expressed are his own.

X: @itskhurramabbas

Published in Dawn, September 19th, 2026

With these new challenges, naturally, the question arises: how prepared are our organisations for change? It is a crucial question, but I believe a more fundamental one lies beneath; are Pakistani organisations ready to learn?

This shift in focus stems from my belief that organisations should prioritise building capability over simply adopting the latest technology or management ideas. Capability encompasses an organisation’s accumulated ability to achieve its purpose; making sound decisions, developing people, learning from experience and adapting to changing circumstances. Results are undoubtedly important — profit, growth, market share, impact and productivity — but they alone do not define good management.

The more important question is whether an organisation is becoming more capable of fulfilling its purpose. Are they making better decisions? Are their people developing? Does experience influence behaviour? Can they respond to environmental changes? And would they continue to perform even if their most senior leader were no longer present?

With new challenges, a fundamental question arises: are Pakistani organisations prepared to learn?

These questions hold particular relevance for Pakistan. We boast many highly capable founders, family-business leaders and senior executives whose market knowledge, relationships and judge­­­ment have often propelled successful enterprises throu­­gh challenging times. However, personal capability alone does not equate to institutional capability.

I have witnessed organisations where every significant decision ultimately falls to the owner(s) or the most experienced person. This applies to difficult customers, major investments, hiring decisions and operational problems — everyone waits for the person who is assumed to know the answer. While this can work well in the short term, with a capable individual at the centre, it leads to a growing dependence on that single person. Managers become adept at escalating problems rather than solving them, and experience becomes concentrated in a few heads rather than embedded in systems, processes and shared judgement.

The organisation might grow larger or become more profitable, but it has not necessarily become stronger. True leadership is not measured by whether everything functions when the leader is present; it is whether the organisation has become more capable in their absence.

This is one reason Pakistani organisations often struggle with succession. We tend to think of succession as simply finding the next CEO or family member, but it is a much broader question. Has the organisation developed people capable of making decisions? Has it created systems that do not rely on personal intervention? Has it made knowledge accessible beyond those who acquired it? Has it given capable younger managers real exposure to challenging work before they are expected to lead? If not, the organisation may have found a successor, but it has not built succession.

The same issue arises with AI. Many leaders are asking which tasks AI can automate, which is a reasonable starting point. However, the more important question is what new capabilities the organisation will need when routine work changes.

Technology matters. AI will change how work is done, which skills matter and what customers expect. But technology does not transform an organisation. People using technology differently might. A company can buy the latest systems, appoint a chief digital officer and run pilots in AI. It can still make the same slow decisions, hide the same bad news, reward the same behaviour and depend on the same few senior people. In that case, technology may simply make the organisation more efficient at doing what is becoming less relevant.

These are management issues, not technology ones. They also explain why so many transformation programmes disappoint. An organisation announces a new strategy, redraws reporting lines, creates a digital team, brings in consultants and launches a new performance management system. Each of these might be sensible but none automatically changes how the organisation behaves.

If people were afraid to speak honestly before the transformation they will remain afraid afterwards. If bad news is softened before reaching senior leadership a new dashboard will simply pre­­sent a cleaner version of the same reality. If managers are rewarded only for their personal results they will have little incentive to develop others.

An organisation learns only when experience changes its behaviour. This requires leaders to protect the flow of difficult information. No institution can learn from a reality it is afraid to see. Leaders must distinguish respect for experience from obedience to hierarchy. Older leaders bring perspective while younger people often understand emerging technologies, customers and expectations more instinctively. Healthy organisations create a conversation between the two.

The old answer to every new question is the clearest sign of institutional ageing. Pakistan’s organisations do not need to imitate every global management trend or become technology companies. They need to become learning institutions — organisations that can use technology without being defined by it, develop people without abandoning accountability, preserve purpose without protecting every old habit and change before failure makes change unavoidable.

The question is not whether Pakistani organisations are ready for change and disruption. It is whether they are ready to learn.

The writer advises boards and CEOs on strategy, leadership and organisational transformation.

Published in Dawn, September 19th, 2026

Chairman of the Committee Senator Sarmad Ali suggested that government advertisements for media organisations not registered with the EOBI should be stopped. The committee decided to seek an in-depth briefing from EOBI on the matter in its upcoming meeting.

During discussion on the state of the media sector, Chairman of Committee Senator Sarmad Ali stressed the need for immediate support to strengthen the industry in the larger public interest. He said, “financial support in the shape of advertising should be provided to the mainstream media industry to combat fake news”. The committee members noted the National Press Trust purpose ceased to exist after the privatisation of its newspapers.

Chairman of the committee while questioning the continuation of the Trust in its present form, remarked that the purpose of the Trust needs to be revisited. He directed that details regarding the National Press Trust’s property and funds should be presented in the next meeting.

Suggestion made to stop govt advertisements for media organisations not registered with EOBI

The committee decided to seek views of the law ministry on amending the NPT deed in line with changed ground realities and for the welfare of the media workers. It also decided to visit Karachi to ins­pect buildings of the NPT, PTV and Radio Pakistan to review plans for their effective utilisation.

On the issue of welfare of media workers, the committee was informed that health insurance for journalists and media workers has been revived, while provision of life insurance is also being considered.

The committee considered the Pakistan Broadcasting Corporation (Amendment) Bill, 2025, introduced by Senator Muhammad Abdul Qadir in the Senate sitting held on Dec 1, 2025.

The proposed legislation seeks to amend the composition of the Pakistan Broadcasting Corporation Board by providing representation to parliamentarians, including one member from the Senate to be nominated by the Chairman of Senate and one member from the National Assembly to be nominated by the Speaker of the National Assembly.

After detailed discussion, the Committee voted on the bill and apart from Senator Pervaiz Rashid all other members present voted in favour of the Pakistan Broadcasting Corporation (Amendment) Bill, 2025, and accordingly it was passed by the committee.

Published in Dawn, September 19th, 2026