The 969 MW Neelum-Jhelum hydropower project in Azad Kashmir, a run-of-the-river composite dam diverting water from the Neelum to the Jhelum via a 52 km tunneling system, was completed in August 2018 after a decade of construction at a staggering $5 billion—six times its original estimated cost. Funded by WAPDA and a national electricity surcharge, and built by China’s Gezhouba Group, the project was meant to secure Pakistan’s water rights under the Indus Water Treaty and provide clean energy. However, it has been plagued by engineering failures: a tailrace tunnel cave-in in July 2022, followed by headrace tunnel cracks and collapse in May 2024, leading to a complete shutdown. In May 2025, it was allegedly hit by Indian mortar shelling, given its proximity (4–5 km) to the Line of Control. Repairs are expected to resume operations only by March 2028. In contrast, India’s 330 MW Kishanganga dam upstream was completed at under $1 billion in the same period and operates successfully. My opinion: The Neelum-Jhelum debacle highlights massive cost overruns, poor geological assessment, and questionable engineering oversight, possibly exacerbated by political and military tensions. While India’s project was one-third the scale, its timely and cost-effective execution underscores Pakistan's systemic issues in mega-project management. The energy crisis and water rights remain unresolved, making this a cautionary account of ambition without robust planning.